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Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable 
sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between 
different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game 
of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the 
entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom 
passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental 
state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s 
account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the 
phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the 
attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports. 
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 N MAKING IT EXPLICIT (hereafter MIE) and subsequent works (1998, 
2002a, 2002b, 2010), Brandom elaborates his particular conception 
of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is often 
characterized as a distinctive kind of knowledge, which has its causal source and 
ultimate epistemological ground in perceptual experience. However, Brandom’s 
account differs from this general and intuitive characterization in that, even 
though it acknowledges the causal relevance of perceptual experience, it tries to 
explain perceptual knowledge without attributing an epistemological role to 
perceptual experience itself. In doing this, Brandom explicitly follows the path 
of Davidson, Rorty, and, in his view, Sellars.1 His proposal is, such as he describes 
it, an inferentialist middle way between Sellars’s epistemological internalism and 
reliabilist externalism. This middle way consists in holding (i) that what makes a 
subject’s observation reports cases of non–inferential knowledge (according to 
the attributor) is the fact of her reliability (according to the attributor), 
regardless of the subject’s attitudes toward her own reliability; and (ii) that 
attributions of perceptual knowledge require not just reliability but also, at least, 
implicit endorsement, on the part of the attributor, of the inference that is the 
practical acknowledgement of the reporter’s reliability (i.e. the inference from 
the occurrence of a report to the endorsement of it). 
However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, 
rather than on perception itself, Brandom completely passes over a conception 
of perceptual experience that, in a suitable reading, can be attributed to two of 
his heroes: Kant and Wittgenstein. This conception can be found in Kant’s first 
Critique and in Wittgenstein’s considerations about seeing aspects. Arguably, for 
these authors, perception is not merely a capacity that elicits observation reports 
 
1  See, for example, Davidson (2001); Rorty (1998); Brandom (2002b). For Brandom’s expressions of explicit 
endorsement of Davidson’s approach, see Brandom (1998, pp. 371–2) and Brandom (2002a, pp. 93–4). 
For a detailed criticism of Davidson’s approach to perceptual experience, see Kalpokas (2012, 2015). For 
a parallel criticism to Rorty’s position about experience, see Kalpokas (2014). 
§1.I 
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(as Brandom seems to believe), but also, crucially, a certain kind of mental state 
with intentional content. Thus, the purpose of the present article is to show that 
Brandom’s theory of perceptual knowledge has an important blind spot: 
although he incorporates many insights from Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s works, he 
unfortunately does not take into account the conception of perceptual 
experience that is present in them. This blind spot prevents Brandom from 
extending the normative character of intentional and contentful mental states to 
perceptual experiences themselves. This is not an innocuous consequence. As I 
will argue, due to this blind spot, Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge is 
unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to 
explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make 
observation reports. 
The article is structured as follows: first, I will briefly present Brandom’s 
theory of perceptual knowledge [§ 2]. Second, I will argue that this theory cannot 
properly explain how our attributions of reliability to others, who make 
observation reports, could be justified [§ 3]. Then, I will argue that Brandom’s 
conception of perceptual knowledge cannot successfully accommodate the 
phenomenon of seeing aspect famously studied by Wittgenstein [§ 4]. The 
concluding section only summarizes the main critical results of the previous 
discussion [§ 5]. 
 
§ 2. In his impressive book, MIE, Robert Brandom elaborates in detail his 
normative pragmatics about human language. According to this theoretical 
approach, the linguistic practices that confer (mainly) propositional content to 
utterances implicitly contain norms concerning how it is correct to use linguistic 
expressions, under what circumstances it is appropriate to perform different 
speech acts, and what the appropriate consequences of such performances are. 
Thus, from this point of view, interpreting mental states, performances, and 
expressions as intentionally contentful is attributing to their occurrences an 
ineliminably normative pragmatic significance. 
According to this theoretical framework, Brandom explains observation 
reports and, in general, perceptual judgments as the product of two 
distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate 
behaviourally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to take up a 
position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This is the account that 
Brandom calls “the two–ply account of observation”, which can originally be 
found, Brandom believes, in Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
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(hereafter EPM).2 
The first capacity is a disposition to reliably respond differentially to distinct 
environing stimuli, that is, to take or treat them as being of one or another kind. 
This is a capacity that we, human beings, share with artefacts of some kinds (e.g. 
thermostats and land mines) and mere sentient creatures (e.g. parrots).3 While 
differential responsiveness is a necessary condition for empirical knowledge, it is 
not, however, a sufficient one. As Brandom points out, this discriminatory 
capacity should not yet be understood as a cognitive matter, on pain of losing 
sight of the fundamental ways in which genuine perceptual knowledge differs 
from what is exhibited by irritable devices such as the already mentioned above.  
The second element of Sellars’s two–ply account of observational knowledge 
is introduced in order to distinguish possessors of genuine observational 
knowledge from merely reliable differential responders. This is the element that, 
according to Brandom, allows us to crucially distinguish between sentient and 
sapient creatures. The subjects that possess observational knowledge have 
reliable dispositions to respond differentially to environmental stimuli by 
applying concepts, that is, they have dispositions to respond with observation 
reports, perceptual beliefs or judgments. The genuine observer is able to respond 
to, say, visible red things by coming to believe, claiming, or reporting that there 
is something red in the immediate environment. So, sapient awareness differs 
from awareness in the sense of mere differential responsiveness in that the 
sapient being is able to responsively classify the stimuli as falling under concepts. 
In turn, the reliable differential response to the visible presence of a state of 
affairs counts as the application of a concept when it can be considered as a move 
in the game of giving and asking for reasons. More specifically, in order to count 
as the application of a concept, the response “must be committing oneself to a 
content that can both serve as and stand in need of reasons, that is, that can play 
the role both of premise and of conclusion in inferences” (Brandom 2002b, p. 
351). In this sense, the reporter’s response (such as saying “That’s red” when she 
is in the presence of something red in her immediate environment) is 
conceptually contentful, Brandom holds, to the extent that it can occupy a node 
 
2  See Brandom (2002b). For an alternative reading of EPM, see McDowell (2009, 2010). 
3  I believe that Brandom’s distinction between sentient and cognitive creatures does not clearly coincide 
with the distinction between human and non–human animals, as he seems to assume. There is an 
important amount of empirical evidence that suggests that some non–human species have, in a certain 
sense, cognitive capacities. For philosophical approaches about animal minds that take into account such 
evidence, see, for example, Danón (2013), Aguilera (2013), Morales (2009), Glock (2010), Camp (2009), 
Carruthers (2009) and Kalpokas (2018). However, since this topic is irrelevant for the purposes of this 
article, I will not discuss it here. 
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in a web of inferential relations. Likewise, the reporter’s grasp of the conceptual 
content expressed by her utterance “That’s red” consists in her knowing what 
follows from her claim and what it follows from, what would count as evidence 
for it and what would be incompatible with it. Thus, an observation report can be 
interpreted as the adoption of a certain kind of stance that can serve as a reason 
for committing to or entitling to adopt other stances, and it is potentially in need 
for reasons that might be supplied by still further stances (e.g. claims or beliefs). 
In chapter IV of MIE, Brandom describes his account of perceptual 
knowledge as “an inferentialist middle way between justificatory internalism and 
reliabilist externalism” (Brandom, 1994, pp. 217–221). According to Brandom, 
reliabilist externalists are right in holding that reliability may entitle a reporter to 
make an observation report even when the reporter does not endorse (not even 
implicitly) the inference that is the practical acknowledgement of the authority 
of such reliability (the inference that Brandom calls the “reliability inference”, 
i.e. the inference that goes from tokens of, say, “That’s red” to the 
acknowledgement of the presence of something red in the immediate 
environment).4 This is a point of discrepancy with Sellars. In effect, in EPM § 35, 
Sellars claims that, in order to be an expression of knowledge, an observation 
report not only must have authority, but this authority must also be recognized 
by the person who makes the report. In contrast, Brandom believes that this last 
step is not necessary. From his point of view, what makes an observation report 
an expression of perceptual knowledge is the fact that the reporter is considered 
to be reliable by the person who attributes the possession of perceptual 
knowledge to her, regardless of the reporter’s attitude towards her own reliability 
(i.e., regardless of whether the reporter also believes in her own reliability or 
not). The status of the reporter’s claim as knowledge is, then, external to her own 
attitudes.5 Notwithstanding this, Sellars is certainly right —Brandom 
acknowledges— in holding that, in order to count as perceptual knowledge at 
all, a reliable report must be elicited by someone who is able to participate in the 
space of reasons. The reporter must be able to understand her own observation 
report, i.e., according to Brandom’s theoretical framework, she must have some 
grip on its role in reasoning, as a potential premise and conclusion of inferential 
justifications. Thus, while reliabilism about cognitive entitlement is correct in 
claiming that perceptual knowledge can be attributed even where the one to 
 
4  See Brandom (1997, p. 158). 
5  The second error that Brandom attributes to Sellars is that of assuming that justification of observation 
reports must involve explicit invocation of reliability, i.e., that a claim of reliability must be one of the 
premises of the reliability inference. See Brandom, (1994, pp. 217–8). 
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whom it is attributed cannot inferentially justify her report, it does not follow 
from this remark that reliability by itself is enough for the entitlement in 
question, apart from all consideration of attitudes of taking the reporter as 
reliable, as reliabilism typically holds. According to Brandom, Sellars is right, 
thus, to insist that attributions of knowledge require, not just reliability, but also, 
at least, implicit endorsement of the inference that is the practical 
acknowledgement of reliability (again, the inference that goes from the 
occurrence of a report such as “That’s red” to the endorsement of it). Yet, Sellars 
is wrong, Brandom believes, in thinking that the one who endorses that inference 
must be the one who undertakes the claim to perceptual knowledge.6 It is the 
attributor of perceptual knowledge who must attribute reliability to the reporter 
of an observation report, not necessarily the reporter herself. In order for an 
observation report to count as non–inferential knowledge, then, it is only 
necessary that the attributor endorses it, at least implicitly, by way of 
acknowledging the reliability inference.  
Now, as it could be appreciated by the reconstruction made so far, Brandom’s 
account of perceptual knowledge exclusively focuses on the commitments and 
entitlements that observation reports involve. However, in this account, 
perceptual experience itself is credited with no epistemological, or semantic, role 
at all. As Brandom claims:  
 
“Experience” is not one of my words. I did not find it necessary to use it in the many pages 
of Making It Explicit (…) I do not see that we need —either in epistemology or, more 
important, in semantics— to appeal to any intermediaries between perceptible facts and 
reports of them that are non–inferentially elicited by the exercise of reliable differential 
responsive dispositions. There are, of course, many causal intermediaries, since the non–
inferential observation report is a propositionally contentful commitment the 
acknowledgment of which stands at the end of a whole causal chain of reliably co–varying 
events (…) But I do not see that any of these has any particular conceptual or (therefore) 
cognitive or semantic significance (Brandom 2000, footnote 7, pp. 205–6). 
 
However, in taking this path, Brandom passes over what I take to be an important 
alternative, namely that of conceiving perceptual experience as a kind of 
 
6  Certainly, Sellars may reply here that, if the reporter were not able to endorse the reliability inference, she 
would neither be able to consider herself as possessing perceptual knowledge. But, in such case, it would 
surely be irrational for herself to reason and act on the basis of her own observation reports. In effect, if 
it were true that the reporter is unable to make the inference that goes from her own report, e.g., “That’s 
red”, to the conclusion that something red is nearby, what reason could she have to acquire other related 
beliefs and to act on the basis of her report?  
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contentful mental state. This is the thesis of one of Brandom’s heroes: Kant. In 
effect, as is well–known, in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant holds, among other 
things, that perceptual experiences involve both intuitions and concepts. In 
claiming this, Kant acknowledges that experience has intentional (indeed, 
conceptual) content.7 Kant’s idea is not that concepts, or a combination of them, 
are mere responses to intuitions (in which case concepts would not be 
presumably needed in order to have perceptual experiences). Rather, the idea is 
that concepts are necessary for bringing the manifold of intuitions to its unity. 
Without the work of concepts in experience, we could not be capable of 
experiencing whole objects at all. To express Kant’s point in Brandom’s terms: 
experience is not merely a reliable differential response to the objects presented 
to us, but, rather, a capacity in virtue of which we conceptually classify what is 
given to the faculty of sensibility. Since such classification can be correct or 
incorrect, Kant implies that perceptual experiences, and not merely observation 
reports elicited by them, have a normative character: they can be evaluated as 
veridical or non–veridical. 
Arguably, a similar conception of perceptual experience can be found in 
another of Brandom’s heroes: Wittgenstein. In effect, Wittgenstein’s reflections 
on seeing aspects can be understood as based on the assumption that perceptual 
experience has intentional content, a kind of content that can change depending 
on —it may plausibly be argued— the concept that one brings to experience (I 
will say more in § 4). As a result, on this interpretation it may be held that, 
according to Wittgenstein, perceptual experience also has, as for Kant, a 
normative character.8 
As I have anticipated in § 1, this is not an innocuous theoretical difference 
between Kant and Wittgenstein, on the one hand, and Brandom, on the other. 
Brandom’s way of conceiving experience faces, I will argue, some particular 
difficulties that Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions do not. Let us examine 
these difficulties in the following two sections. 
 
7  McDowell (1996), Sellars (1967) and Ginsborg (2008) interpret Kant’s first Critique as holding that 
perceptual experience has conceptual content. Recently, Hanna (2005, 2015) and Burge (2010) have 
proposed a non–conceptualist reading of Kant’s account. In any case, however, both in the conceptualist 
reading as in the non–conceptualist one, Kant is credited with the claim according to which experience 
does have intentional content. 
8  Someone might think that, in the particular case of seeing aspects, due to its specific nature, there is not 
something as being right or being wrong. It is, rather, a matter of seeing aspects or not seeing them. I 
think, however, that it makes sense to claim, of a person that sees, for example, a yacht in a puzzle 
painting, that she sees the figure correctly. After all, it is supposed that what is hidden in the puzzle 
painting is a yacht, not any other thing. The yacht, it could be claimed, is there to be seen.  
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§ 3. In part VIII of EPM, after criticizing a well–known form of the Myth of the 
Given (i.e. foundationalism), Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic 
justification. According to Sellars, the epistemic authority of observation reports 
such as “This is red” rests on the fact that the presence of a red object, 
appropriately related to the perceiver, can be inferred from the occurrence of 
such report. Moreover, as we have seen in § 2, Sellars considers that, to be the 
expression of knowledge, not only must such a report have authority, but also this 
authority must be recognized by the reporter. In other words, the person who 
makes the report must be able to infer, from the occurrence of the report “This 
is red”, the existence of something red in the immediate environment.9 Thus, in 
order to express knowledge, an occurrence of an observation report such as “This 
is red”, when it takes place in standard conditions, not only must it be a symptom 
or sign of the presence of a red object, but also the perceiver must know that 
tokens of “This is red” are  symptoms of the presence of red objects in conditions 
that are suitable for visual perception.10 Hence, Sellars concludes that perceptual 
knowledge of particular facts presupposes that one knows general facts of the 
form X is a reliable symptom of Y. Acknowledging the truth of this point requires, 
Sellars claims, abandoning the traditional empiricist idea according to which 
perceptual knowledge stands on its own. So, although there is a logical dimension 
in which empirical propositions rest on a level of observation reports (which 
certainly are non–inferentially acquired), “there is another logical dimension in 
which the latter rest on the former” (Sellars EPM, § 38).  
Now, Sellars’s conception of epistemic justification clearly faces the following 
difficulty.11 As we have already seen, the epistemic authority of observation 
reports lies —according to Sellars— on their reliability: observation reports are 
symptoms or signs of the presence of the reported entities. And, as Sellars insists, 
in order to be instances of perceptual knowledge, that reliability must be 
recognized by the subject who makes the report. However, at this point, the 
following question naturally arises: how could the subject know that her 
observation reports are, in general, reliable signs of the presence of the items that 
they report? In other words, how could a subject know that her observation 
reports, such as different tokens of “This is red”, are symptoms or signs of the 
presence, in the immediate environment, of red objects in standard conditions? 
 
9  As it was pointed out in § 2, this is a point of discrepancy between Sellars and Brandom. 
10  See Sellars, EPM, § 35. This move presupposes a “Level Ascent”, which has been the target of some 
criticisms. See, e.g, Alston (1983) and Brandom (1997). 
11  See De Vries (2000), Williams (2009), Kalpokas (2017). 
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It seems that, given the theoretical framework of EPM, Sellars has no other 
alternative than to answer that we know about general statements of the form X 
is a reliable symptom of Y in virtue of our inductive knowledge about different 
instances of observation reports such as “This is red”. But this is clearly circular. 
In effect, on the one hand, Sellars is holding that the recognition of the epistemic 
authority of an observation report such as “This is red” rests on a general 
statement of the form “The observation report ‘This is red’ is a reliable symptom 
of the presence of a red object in standard conditions of perception”. On the 
other hand, however, it seems that knowledge of such general facts in turn rests 
inductively on the knowledge that observation reports of such kind (i.e. “This is 
red”) are reliable (i.e. they can be taken to be true). Thus, observation reports 
both justify, and are justified by, general statements about their reliability to 
register the presence of the relevant objects in the immediate environment. 
Sellars unsuccessfully struggled with that problem along his career.12 It is not 
my purpose here to consider Sellars’s different attempts of giving a plausible 
solution to it. Rather, I only want to indicate here that, despite the slight 
differences with Sellars’s theory of epistemic justification, Brandom’s account of 
perceptual knowledge inherits exactly the same difficulty. In effect, how could a 
person, who attributes reliability to other reporters, know that their observation 
reports are, in general, reliable signs of the presence of the items that they report? 
In other words, how could an attributor of perceptual knowledge know that a 
reporter’s observation reports (such as different tokens of “This is red”) are 
reliable? It seems that, given the theoretical framework of MIE and his later work, 
Brandom has no other alternative than to answer that the attributors know about 
general statements of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y in virtue of their 
inductive knowledge about instances of observation reports such as “This is red”. 
But, just as in the case of Sellars, this is clearly circular: on the one hand, Brandom 
would be claiming that the attributor’s endorsement of tokens of observation 
reports such as “This is red” (i.e. her taking them to be true), when these are 
made by the appropriate reporters, rests on general statements of the form 
“Observation reports such as ‘This is red’, when they are made by the appropriate 
reporters, are reliable symptoms of the presence of red objects in standard 
conditions of perception”. On the other hand, however, it seems that knowledge 
of such general facts inductively rests on the knowledge that tokens of 
observation reports, such as “This is red”, when they are made by the appropriate 
reporters, are reliable (i.e. they can be taken to be true). Thus, again, observation 
 
12  Indeed, Sellars gives an initial solution, which is unsuccessful to my mind, to that problem in EPM § 36 
and § 37. I consider that initial solution and further intents of solving the problem in question in 
Kalpokas (2017). 
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reports both would justify, and would be justified by, general statements about 
their reliability to register the presence of the relevant objects in the immediate 
environment. 
Brandom’s discrepancy with Sellars does not help him to avoid that epistemic 
circle. Even when only the attributor is the one who must make, or practically 
assume, the relevant reliability inference, the question that makes the circle arise 
appears anyway. In Brandom’s account, it is the attributor, not the reporter, who 
faces the problem of circularity when her attributions of perceptual knowledge 
are challenged. But, in any case, the same problem arises. Both Sellars’s and 
Brandom’s accounts seem to share this flaw.  
It is worth noting here that this result is valid even when the endorsement of 
the reliability inference is implicit. In effect, even in the case in which the 
attributor’s endorsement of the reliability inference is not explicit, it is supposed 
that she has, or may have, some reasons for her endorsement. These reasons are 
the ones that the attributor must be able to explicitly give just in case her taking 
the reporter as reliable is challenged. In such a case, then, the mentioned 
circularity would inevitably arise again. Thus, the “default and challenge” model 
of justification, which is involved in the contrast between explicit and implicit 
endorsement, is of no help here. As a result, it can be claimed that the two–ply 
account of perceptual knowledge (in both versions, Sellars’s and Brandom’s) 
faces the problem of an epistemic circle. This circle, I take it, is a symptom of a 
flaw in how epistemic justification of observation reports is explained. 
Now, I believe that the source of such a flaw lies in Brandom’s conception of 
perceptual experience. In holding that we do not need to postulate any 
“intermediaries” between perceptible facts and the reports of them; in implying 
that perceptual experience is only a mere causal intermediary; and, finally, in 
claiming that experience has no conceptual, cognitive or semantic significance, 
Brandom renounces to seriously take into consideration a Kantian approach to 
perception. Indeed, in his discussions with McDowell, Brandom has repeatedly 
resisted to adopt such approach.13 However, this approach could help him to 
provide an intuitive and common sense justification of observation reports and, 
thus, a suitable answer to the question of how an attributor could know that a 
reporter’s observation reports are, in general, reliable signs of the presence of 
the items that they report. The intuitive answer is this: one could justify an 
observation report such as “This is red” by seeing whether or not the object 
referred by the demonstrative is, in fact, red. Accordingly, an attributor could 
know that the observation reports made by a reporter are reliable just by 
 
13  See Brandom (1998, 2002a, 2010). 
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appealing to her own perceptual experience of the states of affairs to which the 
reports refer. In fact, it is not clear at all how one could know whether observation 
reports, made by others or even by oneself, are true or not if it is not by appealing 
to perceptual experience (interpreted as it is suggested here).14 And without that 
knowledge, it seems that the reliability of reporters cannot be determined.  
The importance of this alternative lies, not only on the fact that it provides a 
simple and intuitive account of how observation reports are, or can be, justified; 
but also on that it allows us to avoid the epistemic circle that we have detected in 
Brandom’s account. In effect, the circle disappears as soon as we acknowledge 
that perceptual experiences, in virtue of their content, can have the epistemic 
role of justifying observation reports, because in such a case it is no longer 
necessary to appeal to general statements of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y in 
order to justify those reports. One (e.g. the attributor of perceptual knowledge) 
could claim that knowledge of general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y 
rests on the inductive knowledge of many tokens of the report “This is red”, 
whereas one recognizes that the epistemic justification of those tokens depends, 
not on one’s knowledge of the aforementioned general facts, but rather on one’s 
perception of the relevant facts. 
At this point, it may be worth noting that the mere appeal to perceptual 
experience does not necessarily commit us to the Myth of the Given. In effect, we 
are not obliged to assume that perceptual experiences are— in Sellars terms— 
“non–verbal episodes of awareness” (EPM § 34), or to hold that such episodes 
enjoy an intrinsic epistemic authority. One could maintain, for instance, that 
perceptual experiences involve the actualization of our conceptual capacities, as 
McDowell has repeatedly insisted (McDowell 1996, 2009), and thereby claim that 
perceptual content is conceptual in character. This would be a Kantian 
alternative that would allow us to avoid at once both the epistemic circle and the 
Myth of the Given.  
 
§ 4. Moreover, and for similar reasons, Brandom’s conception of perceptual 
experience seems to be completely different from the one that is held, or 
assumed, by another of his heroes, namely, Wittgenstein. In effect, in the second 
 
14  Of course, in order to know that a certain reporter is reliable, an attributor could compare the reporter’s 
observation reports with her own ones. But, then, the question would be: how could she know, in turn, 
that her own reports are true? If the answer is that she (the attributor) knows that her observation reports 
are true because she knows that she is reliable in making such kind of reports, then we have the circle 
already outlined again: the attributor would be taking her own observation reports as true because she 
would be taking herself to be reliable, and she would be taking herself to be reliable because she would 
be taking her own reports as true. 
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part of Philosophical Investigations (hereafter PI), section XI, Wittgenstein 
famously considers some well–known cases of seeing–as. Although this section 
certainly is difficult to interpret and it contains many obscure remarks, it seems 
to imply, nevertheless, a relatively definite conception of perceptual experience 
(in particular, visual experience).15 In what follows, then, I would like to argue 
that Brandom’s conception of experience is not only different from 
Wittgenstein’s, but also that it cannot properly explain the very phenomenon of 
seeing aspects. This, I will hold, speaks in favour of a conception of perception as 
a kind of mental state with intentional content.  
In section XI of PI, Wittgenstein begins by distinguishing two uses of the word 
“see”: the first one appears when, to a question such as “What do you see there?” 
one answers “I see this” (followed by a description or a drawing). The second one, 
however, appears when somebody says, for example, “I see a likeness in these two 
faces”. So, let us suppose that I see a certain face and, suddenly, I notice its 
likeness to another one. Certainly, I see that the first one has not changed, but 
now I see it differently.16 This is the phenomenon that Wittgenstein calls 
“noticing an aspect” (PI, xi, § 113).  
Something similar occurs with the famous duck–rabbit figure: I can see the 
figure as a head of a duck or as a head of a rabbit; and even when I can see 
something different in each case, it is true that the figure has not changed at all. 
If, indeed, I am able to grasp the ambiguity in the figure, I can alternatively say 
“Now I see the figure as a duck” or “Now I see it as a rabbit”.17 The possibility of 
grasping the ambiguity of a figure (as it happens in the duck–rabbit case), or of 
seeing the likeness between two things (as it happens in the case of the two faces), 
is an essential feature of the phenomenon of seeing aspects. To the person who 
can only see the duck, say, in the duck–rabbit figure, there is no place for what 
Wittgenstein calls an “aspect’s lighting up” (PI, xi, § 118). In effect, as 
Wittgenstein points out, if a person can only see the figure as a duck, it seems 
that there is no point in describing what she sees by saying “Now she sees the 
figure as a duck”, because to what different possibility could one be implicitly 
referring to by saying that now she sees the figure as a duck? Thus, the aspect’s 
 
15  Although not only of visual experience. For a consideration of other non–visual examples in 
Wittgenstein’s work, see, for instance, Ahmed (2017). 
16  Glock holds that the situation in which something that is seen changes in one respect, whereas remains 
the same in another, constitutes “the paradoxical appearance of aspect–dawning” (Glock, 1996, p. 37). In 
reconstructing the way in which Wittgenstein supposedly dissolves this paradox, Ahmed distinguishes 
between the optic content of sight and the synoptic content of it. See Ahmed (2017, pp. 527 ff.). 
17  “The expression of a change of aspect”, Wittgenstein claims, “is an expression of a new perception and, at 
the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception” (PI, xi, § 130) 
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lighting up, Wittgenstein claims, contrasts with seeing an aspect continuously (PI, 
xi, § 118).18  
How does Wittgenstein explain the phenomenon of seeing as? As it happens 
with other topics of Wittgenstein’s work, there is no agreement among the 
scholars on this point. However, for my present purpose, it is not important to 
decide what exactly Wittgenstein’s account is, because my crucial point will be 
that, whatever “the correct” interpretation of Wittgenstein’s texts is, Wittgenstein 
seems to assume, or take for granted, that perception has intentional content. 
Admittedly, the contemporary notion of intentional content, such as it is used in 
current discussions of philosophy of mind, may be alien to Wittgenstein’s 
thought. But even if this were the case, I think that the introduction of that notion 
(understood, minimally, as the idea according to which, in perception, things 
appear in a certain way) could be of help to understand the very phenomenon 
of seeing aspects and Wittgenstein’s remarks about it. In fact, it seems to me that 
the assumption in question is a common ground for most of the interpretations 
that have been elaborated about this point of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.19  
So, to begin with, it is worth noting that the incapability to see a likeness or to 
detect an ambiguity in a figure —what Wittgenstein calls “aspect–blindness” (PI, 
xi, § 257)— does not imply defective sight. Likewise, the capacity to see aspects is 
not explained only by good vision, or by a change in the visual impressions (PI, 
xi, § 130), or by a modification of the object that is seen. No thing that is merely 
given to the sight or that causes our visual impressions explains the change of 
aspects. The person who is able to see the duck and the rabbit certainly sees the 
same figure as the person who is not able to see them. In other words, the very 
same sensory inputs can produce two different perceptual experiences in two 
different perceivers depending on their capacity for seeing aspects.20 Indeed, the 
difference between the perceivers seems to reside in how they interpret the 
figure. As Wittgenstein claims: “We can also see the illustration now as one thing, 
now as another. So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it” (PI, xi, § 116). The 
 
18  Baz insists on this point in (2000). There is some discussion among the scholars of Wittgenstein’s work 
about whether seeing aspect is a general or a local phenomenon. See, for example, Strawson (1974), 
Mulhall (1990), Shroeder (2010), Ahmed (2017) and Glock (2016). Although I find the idea that all 
perception is aspectual (no matter what Wittgenstein believed about this) very plausible, I do not need 
to enter into that debate here. Whether or not all perception involves aspect–perception, my argument 
in this section will be, modestly, that Brandom’s two–ply account faces decisive difficulties to explain this 
phenomenon. 
19  See, for example, McGinn (1997, 2015), Glock (2016), Ahmed (2017), Strawson (1974), Mulhall (1990). 
The exceptions are Travis (2015) and Hutto (2015), who not only hold that perception has no 
representational content al all, but also that Wittgenstein believed this. 
20  Of course, when I say “the very same sensory inputs”, I mean “the same distal inputs”.  
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interpretation presupposes that we think about the figure in a certain way, that 
we relate it with one or another object: “And that’s why the lighting up of an 
aspect seems half visual experience, half thought” (PI, xi, § 140). However, it is 
crucial to notice here that it is not the case that seeing aspects consists just in 
seeing plus a certain interpretation.21 In other words, seeing aspects is not a case 
in which we add an interpretation to a perceptual content whose features as such 
remain unchanged. Rather, as PI, xi, § 116 suggests, the interpretation is in the 
seeing itself; it arranges the lines and colours that are seen. As Wittgenstein puts 
it, when I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle–picture, “I recognize that it has 
not only shape and colour, but also a quite particular ‘organization’” (PI, xi, § 
131). The result is a new way of seeing a figure, a gestalt change22 in what one 
experiences (and not a mere change in how one interprets a figure, as it would 
be if seeing aspects were just seeing plus a certain interpretation).23 If we 
consider, just as it is commonly done, that the phenomenal aspect of the 
experience consists in the peculiar character with which things are presented in 
perceptual experience, then we can say that the phenomenal difference between 
the experiences of the perceiver who is able to see aspects and the one who is not 
able to do so is due to the particular form in which the former, but not the latter, 
manages to think of (interprets, in the sense recently mentioned) what she sees.  
Now, even when my reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s remarks about seeing 
aspects has been incomplete and very sketchy, it is sufficient, I think, to realize 
that Brandom’s account of perception is quite different from the one that can be 
plausibly attributed to Wittgenstein. In effect, while Brandom restricts his 
account of perception to the role played by observation reports, which are caused 
by perceptual experience, Wittgenstein, in turn, focuses his attention on the 
gestalt change involved in visual perception itself. Seeing something as 
something else counts, for Wittgenstein, as a contentful mental state because it 
involves thought, interpretation, and recognition that some particular 
organisation of the lines and colours of a picture corresponds to the 
 
21  See what Wittgenstein says in PI, xi, § 245. In xi, § 144 he suggests that seeing–as involves a fusion of 
both seeing and thinking. 
22  To speak in terms of “Gestalt change” does not commit me, by itself, with a Gestaltist explanation of the 
phenomenon of seeing aspects. For a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s criticism to the Gestalt tradition 
in psychology, see Ahmed (2017). See also Glock (2016). 
23  Glock (2016) points out that, in seeing different aspects in a figure, the organization of the material object 
(the figure itself) remains the same, of course; while the intentional object, in contrast, does not. The 
intentional object of sight is the object such as it is imaginatively conceived by the subject. It is this object 
the one that changes with the different ways of organization. In my opinion, we should not conceive the 
intentional object as completely separated from the material object, as it were a completely different 
thing. Rather, it is the same material object the one that is seen and conceived in different ways. 




Disputatio 8, no. 9 (2019): pp. 00-00 
 
configuration of a certain object. In the case at hand, in seeing the figure as, say, 
a duck, one is sensorily conscious of the duck, one sees the head of a duck in the 
figure itself. Thus, it may be thought that making the report “This is a duck”, 
whereas one is seeing the figure as a duck, can be taken, according to 
Wittgenstein’s point of view, as a way of expressing the content of one’s visual 
experience, a way of putting into words the aspect of which one is sensorily 
conscious (and not merely a way of differentially responding to a distal stimulus 
with the appropriate observation report24). In contrast, according to Brandom’s 
two–ply account, the report “This is a duck”, even if it could be taken as a reliable 
report, cannot be considered as the expression of the content of one’s visual 
experience (the particular aspect under which one sees the duck–rabbit figure), 
because visual experience, on Brandom’s view, has no content at all.  
Now, how could Brandom’s two–ply account accommodate the phenomenon 
of seeing aspects? Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could achieve this. 
Remember that Brandom’s account appeals to the combination of two 
distinguishable sorts of capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate 
behaviourally between different sorts of stimuli; and (ii) the capacity to 
consequently produce an observation report, i.e. the capacity to take up a 
position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Now, let us consider the 
case of the duck–rabbit figure as a paradigmatic example of seeing aspects. How 
could the two–ply account handle this case? The only distal stimulus at play here 
is the figure itself. We can initially suppose that, in front of the same stimulus, a 
subject is able to differentially respond, alternatively, with two distinctive 
observation reports, i.e. “This is a duck” or “This is a rabbit”. So far, so good. 
However, if perceptual experience were a mere causal intermediary between the 
figure and the reports elicited by it, if experience did not have “any particular 
conceptual or (therefore) cognitive or semantic significance” (Brandom 2000, fn 
7, pp. 205–6), as Brandom claims, why would the subject respond with two 
different reports to the same stimulus? What reason could she have for 
alternatively claiming “This is a duck” or “This is a rabbit” as a consequence of 
experiencing the same picture? Of course, we could imagine many occasional 
reasons in virtue of which a subject may do so; but the relevant reason here has 
 
24  Perhaps it is not completely adequate to speak of “observation reports” in reference to linguistic 
expressions that are used to describe the aspects under which a person sees a figure. However, if we are 
cautious in the use of this terminology, and if we have in mind the obvious differences between straight 
observation reports (e.g. “This’s green”) and reports such as “Now I see this as a duck” or, directly, “This 
is a duck” (in reference to a seen aspect in the duck—rabbit figure), we can use that terminology without 
any harm. After all, reports such as the latter ones are, in a certain sense, reports of certain kind of 
observation.  
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to do with the different ways in which the same figure visually appears to the 
subject, i.e. with the different ways of organizing the elements of the picture. This 
is an essential part of the phenomenon of seeing aspect itself. From 
Wittgenstein’s point of view, a person that is able to see the duck and the rabbit 
in the duck–rabbit figure can alternatively claim “This is a rabbit” or “This is a 
duck” because she can see the same figure as a rabbit and as a duck. Her reports 
express different perceptual contents. In contrast, from Brandom’s point of view, 
nothing similar can be said. But, then, what sense would the reports in question 
have for a person that sees the duck–rabbit figure? What could such reports 
express? Not, obviously, the aspect according to which a person sees the figure, 
because, for Brandom, experience has no cognitive, or semantic significance. So, 
what could the reports express? The key difficulty of Brandom’s account lies, I 
think, in the fact that the capacity of alternatively responding with two different 
observation reports, in the relevant sense, seems to rest on the “previous” capacity 
of seeing different aspects in one and the same figure. Unfortunately, however, 
this latter capacity is not taken into consideration by the two–ply account. 
In order to see the problem that the two–ply account faces more clearly, let 
us consider the following possible situation. We can imagine that a person may 
have learnt, as a consequence of an adequate training, to respond to a puzzle 
picture, for example, with the observation report, say, “This is an old woman”, 
whenever she is confronted to it, even when she is actually unable to notice the 
relevant aspect. This is, I think, a perfectly conceivable situation. In such a case, 
the person would certainly be able to produce the relevant observation report in 
the appropriate circumstances, but, by stipulation, she would not be capable, yet, 
of seeing the lines that compose the figure as a face of an old woman.25 Thinking 
about this sort of case can help us realize that the capacity of seeing aspects is 
clearly different from the capacity of making observation reports. In such possible 
situation, making the relevant observation report would be perfectly compatible 
with having what Wittgenstein calls “aspects–blindness”, i.e. the incapability to 
see aspects. So, the mere appeal to the capacity to reliably make observation 
 
25  I think that Wittgenstein envisages this possibility in PI, xi, § 257. There, he claims “The aspect–blind 
man is supposed not to see the A aspects change. But is he also supposed not to recognize that the double 
cross contains both a black and a white cross? So if told “Show me figures containing a black cross among 
these examples?” will he be unable to manage? No. He is supposed to be able to do that, but not to say 
“Now it is a white cross in a black ground!” “. Strawson conceives a similar situation. He claims, “We 
could perhaps imagine someone able to treat a picture in a certain way, painstakingly to interpret it in 
that way without seeing the relevant aspect, without seeing it as he was treating it as, at all”, (1974, p. 63). 
The main idea here is that we can imagine a person that can interpret a picture in different ways, without 
actually seeing it in different ways. In the text, I try to exploit this kind of possible situations in order to 
show that Brandom’s two–ply account misses the point of seeing aspects. 




Disputatio 8, no. 9 (2019): pp. 00-00 
 
reports does not explain, by itself, the capacity to see aspects. But the appeal to 
perceptual experience, conceived in Brandom’s lines, even in combination with 
the capacity to make observation reports, cannot do so either, because 
experience is understood, by Brandom, as a mere causal intermediary between 
the figure and the reports elicited by it. Thus, it seems that the two–ply account 
does not have the theoretical resources to apprehend the phenomenon of seeing 
aspects itself. Consequently, it cannot properly explain why a person, situated in 
front of a figure (e.g. a puzzle–picture), could have the relevant reason to claim 
something of the form “Now I see this as such and such”. 
As in the case of the problem discussed in § 3, I believe that the root cause of 
the difficulties that the two–ply account faces in trying to explain the 
phenomenon of seeing aspects lies in its incapability to properly acknowledge a 
general feature of perceptual experience, namely, its intentional content and, 
more specifically speaking here, its phenomenal character.26 The phenomenal 
character of an experience is frequently characterized, in Nagel’s words, as “what 
it is like to have” that particular experience (Nagel 1974; Chalmers 2006; 
Shoemaker 1994a, 1994b; Fish 2009). More substantially characterized, the 
phenomenal character of an experience is also often conceived as an aspect of its 
representational content, i.e. the way in which the world is presented in the 
phenomenology of the experience (Chalmers 2006; Shoemaker 1994a).27  
Now, regarding the phenomenal character of experience, it could be claimed 
that, in looking at, say, the duck–rabbit figure, we are not only capable of 
producing the relevant observation report, but also, and crucially, of seeing the 
relevant aspects in the figure. As Wittgenstein notes in analysing such cases, we 
can see the figure as we interpret it. The interpretation is in the seeing itself —
Wittgenstein points out— not merely in the response to the figure (i.e., in the 
observation report). Depending on the interpretation, we can recognize a 
particular organization in the lines that compose the figure, i.e., in virtue of the 
concept that we bring to the figure in order to interpret it, we can attribute a 
 
26  Terminological variations include “qualitative character” (Shoemaker, 1994b), “subjective character” 
(Brewer 2006), and “phenomenal content” (Campbell 2002). Interestingly, Brandom (2010, pp. 322–323) 
seems to acknowledge that the fact of not regarding the phenomenal character of experience constitutes 
a weakness of his account.  
27  Some philosophers think that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is not a feature of its 
representational content. According to them, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by 
the very objects and properties of the environment. See, for instance, Campbell (2002) and Brewer (2006, 
2011). However, I do not believe that this is an adequate way of characterizing the phenomenology of 
experience. Although I cannot argue for this point here, I believe that cases of seeing aspects constitute 
counter–examples of that conception of the phenomenology of perception. 
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certain meaning to the lines and colours that compose the figure.28 What is thus 
arranged is not a mental image, but, rather, the very figure itself. So, it could 
plausibly be claimed that what emerges to sight in turn is, then, a head of a duck 
and a head of a rabbit, not merely the propositional contents “This is a rabbit” or 
“This is a duck”. This intuitively explains why a person could be able to 
alternatively make the observation reports “This is a duck” or “This is a rabbit”: 
because she is able to alternatively see these aspects in the figure. So, even when 
a single picture causally affects a person’s senses, when she is equipped with the 
relevant concepts and an appropriate imagination, she can be able to see 
different aspects in the figure. Consequently, we can intuitively hold that the 
observation reports “This is a duck” and “This is a rabbit” are not merely 
responses to a blind distal stimulus, but, rather, linguistic devices for expressing 
the intentional content of experience, i.e. the different ways in which a same 
figure can appear to us.  
  
 
§ 5. I have argued that Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge faces two 
difficulties: It cannot properly explain how attributions of perceptual knowledge 
could be justified, and, moreover, it cannot accommodate the well–known 
phenomenon of seeing aspects. The source of both difficulties is, I have claimed, 
the same one: Brandom’s two–ply account passes over the very capacity of 
perceiving. In doing so, Brandom departs from two of his heroes, Kant and 
Wittgenstein, who arguably held, leaving aside obvious differences, that 
perceptual experience is a kind of contentful mental state. As I have suggested, 
the adoption of a view that acknowledges the distinctive contentful character of 




28  Glock (2016) holds that seeing aspects involves a non–conceptual level in the content of perceptual 
experience. He gives the examples of seeing a face (at a non–conceptual level one sees the same face 
before and after noticing a likeness with another face), and that of seeing a double–cross (see 
Wittgenstein, PI, xi, § 212). However, I disagree with this appeal to non–conceptualism. Of course, in 
order to see a face (or a double–cross), no concept is needed; but seeing a face as a face, or a double–cross 
as a double–cross, or even seeing that it is the same face, or that it is the same double–cross, is a quite 
different matter. In my opinion, what is involved in these latter cases is perceptual knowledge, and this 
kind of knowledge requires that the relevant concepts articulate what is given to experience. Of course, I 
cannot defend this thesis here. In any case, the important point is that, even if seeing aspects involved 
non–conceptual content, it would still be true that experience has intentional content. This is the crucial 
point that I try to exploit in my discussion of Brandom.  
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